Panel IV: Censorship of Cable Television’s Leased and Public Access Channels by Heins, Majorie et al.
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 4 Volume IV 
Number 3 Volume IV Book 3 Article 4 
1994 
Panel IV: Censorship of Cable Television’s Leased and Public 
Access Channels 
Majorie Heins 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Arts Censorship Project 
James N. Horwood 
Spiegel & McDiarmid 
Robert T. Perry 
Michael Sitcov 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Majorie Heins, James N. Horwood, Robert T. Perry, and Michael Sitcov, Panel IV: Censorship of Cable 
Television’s Leased and Public Access Channels, 4 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 801 (1994). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol4/iss3/4 
This Transcript is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Panel IV: Censorship of Cable Televi-
sion's Leased and Public Access
Channels
Moderator: Professor James E. Fleminga
Panelists: Marjorie Heins, Esq.b
James N. Horwood, Esq.c
Robert T. Perry, Esq.d
Michael Sitcov, Esq.'
PROFESSOR FLEMING: Welcome to the fourth panel of our
program. We're going to focus on censorship of cable television's
leased and public access channels. We'll cover a broad range of
issues, I hope. Although I'm the moderator, in this crowd of First
Amendment absolutists I don't want to exercise too much control
over the course of the discussion.
Among the issues we expect to take up will be the following:
What is the future of the indecency standard as applied to cable?
Are the indecency provisions of the 1992 Cable Act' unconstitu-
tional? What role should the Federal Communications Commission
a. Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law, New York, NY;
University of Missouri, A.B. 1977 (summa cum laude); Princeton University, A.M. 1981,
Ph.D. 1988; Harvard University, J.D. 1985 (magna cum laude).
b. Director and Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Arts
Censorship Project, New York, NY; Cornell University, B.A. 1967 (with distinction); Har-
vard University, J.D. 1978 (magna cum laude).
c. Partner, Spiegel & McDiarmid, Washington, D.C.; University of Pennsylvania,
B.S. 1958, LL.B. 1961.
d. New York, NY; Brown University, Sc.B.-A.B. 1969, M.S. 1971; Columbia Uni-
versity, J.D. 1974.
e. Senior Trial Counsel, Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Northwestern University, B.A. 1973; Emory University, J.D.
1977.
1. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 10, 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 531, 532(h), 532(j),
558 (Supp. IV 1992)).
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("FCC") play in regulating freedom of expression? And, is self-
censorship by the converging media entities a threat?
In connection with those topics, we'll also talk about the two
recent District of Columbia Court of Appeals opinions that were
handed down in November of 1993, Action for Children's Televi-
sion v. FCC ("ACT II1"), 2 and Alliance for Community Media v.
FCC.3 Both cases struck down indecency regulations. Indeed,
three out of four of our panelists took part in the latter case, and
one of them, Marjorie Heins, took part in the former case as well.
Now, let me introduce our panelists, and then I'll outline the
order of discussion. First, we have Marjorie Heins, who is director
and staff counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union Founda-
tion' s Arts Censorship Project and also the author of a recent book,
Sex, Sin and Blasphemy: A Guide to America's Censorship Wars.4
She's been active in a number of litigations involving censorship,
including both of the cases I just mentioned.
We also have James N. Horwood, a partner in Spiegel &
McDiarmid in Washington, D.C. He has done work with the
Alliance for Community Media and also was on the brief in the
Alliance case that I mentioned earlier.
Next is Professor Robert Perry, who has been involved in a
number of cases concerning the media, including cable access
channels. Before I came to Fordham, I practiced litigation at
Cravath, Swaine & Moore for a few years and, in fact, worked
with Bob Joffe and Marc Apfelbaum, who were on the second
panel this morning. We had the privilege of litigating against Pro-
fessor Perry in a lawsuit that he brought on behalf of the New
York Citizens Committee on Cable Television against our client,
Manhattan Cable TV.5 He, too, was involved in Alliance.
Finally, we have Michael Sitcov, who is senior trial counsel,
2. 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter ACT Ill].
3. 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
4. MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN AND BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S CEN-
SORSHIP WARS (The New Press 1993).
5. New York Citizens Comm. on Cable TV v. Manhattan Cable TV, Inc., 651 F.
Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
[Vol. 4:801
SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON CENSORSHIP
Federal Programs Branch, in the Civil Division of the Department
of Justice. In that capacity, he has been involved in the important
cable case, Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC.
6
Now, I shall briefly outline what our order of discussion will
be. Jim Horwood will open with a discussion of the background
and an overview of access and censorship. He'll also discuss the
recent cases in the D.C. Circuit invalidating indecency regulations.
Furthermore, since Jim has been here all day, he'll try to tie this
panel together with some of the discussion in earlier panels.
Then, Michael Sitcov will present the arguments on the govern-
ment's side, defending the FCC's indecency regulations. We'll
also ask him among other things to try to articulate what the role
of the FCC should be in regulating freedom of expression.
Next, Marjorie Heins will address censorship, especially from
the standpoint of concern for arts censorship. Among the litiga-
tions she's worked on is Finley v. National Endowment for the
Arts,7 a suit that seeks to invalidate the requirement that all federal
arts grants comply with general standards of decency.
Finally, Robert Perry will broaden the discussion somewhat to
take up censorship of hate speech. Robert has handled cable access
cases defending the rights of racist groups such as the Ku Klux
Klan.8
So, let's begin with Jim Horwood.
MR. HORWOOD: Thank you. I'm glad I'm going ahead of
Marjorie, because one of the issues that is kind of driving me and
may be discussed a lot during this panel is diversity. I'm the six-
teenth white male to speak of sixteen speakers here. It's a diversi-
ty perspective that I'm going to give you that you really haven't
heard about in any of the prior panels, except possibly to the extent
that David Bronston talked somewhat about the public, educational
and governmental channels.
6. 810 F. Supp. 1302 (D.D.C. 1992).
7. 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
8. Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, Mo., 723 F. Supp. 1347
(W.D. Mo. 1989).
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What we're really dealing with here are two kinds of channels,
leased access and the so-called PEG access channels-public, edu-
cational and governmental-and for purposes of this discussion, it
will be the public access part of it. This is the kind of program-
ming that isn't going to be carried by the broadcasters, by the cable
companies, and by the telephone companies, because if it was go-
ing to be carried by them, there wouldn't be a need for the federal
regulation or local regulation that we've seen for a number of years
to allow what I'll call the under-resourced to be able to use the
electronic medium.9 Without having some kind of provision in the
law that guarantees people the right to use this medium, a large
segment of the population won't be able to use it. As we move
into the new technologies and new ways of communicating, it's all
the more important that some mechanism be set aside for the folks
who aren't the media conglomerates with lots of resources to be
able to use this medium to communicate with each other and with
other people.
Public access has a longer history than leased access. The
FCC, when it was regulating cable back in the early '70s, required
a certain segment of the spectrum of cable channels to be set aside
for public, educational and governmental access.' These are chan-
nels that are available for the public to be able to use on a non-
content or non-viewpoint-based basis, and it's usually first come,
first served. It could follow a model of a lottery, although I'm not
aware where that's been used. When Congress changed the regula-
tion of the cable industry in 1984 ("1984 Cable Act")," it provided
for local franchising authorities-which are typically cities, but
sometimes states-to require PEG access channels to be set aside
in a franchise.1 2 It's an optional provision-governments can es-
tablish PEG access channels, but are not required to. It also re-
quired cable systems to set aside a certain percentage of capacity
9. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 531-532 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
10. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 192, 197 (1972); 47 C.F.R.
§ 76.251 (1974).
11. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988).
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for leased access use which is commercial use, which is channels
available for hire. 13
A problem under the 1984 Cable Act was there was no mecha-
nism for regulating the rates to be charged by cable operators, so
you wound up having leased access virtually non-existent except
for, I guess, New York City and a few other places where there
were some leased access channels and programming. When it
passed the 1992 Cable Act, Congress attempted to redress this
perceived problem by providing some mechanism for rate regula-
tion by the FCC.14
The thrust of both the leased access and the PEG access provi-
sions was to provide the widest possible diversity of information
sources and services to the public. That was set forth in the 1984
Cable Act, and the 1992 Cable Act really didn't change that, so
capacity was being set aside. From the standpoint of public access,
cities could require facilities and equipment to be set aside for
access use-which is important, because you have to have a studio
to be able to come in and use these channels-and a function that
public access organizations have served is as a training vehicle for
people to be able to use this medium.
A statistic that the Alliance for Community Media likes to toss
out is that there are 20,000 hours a week of programming on PEG
access channels, which is more than all the broadcast channels
combined. People tend to at times perceive PEG access as some-
thing marginal, but it's not. It's significant, and a lot of the debate
which caused Congress to pass the censorship provisions we're
going to be talking about concerned a few highly visible problems
of programs that may be pushing the edge of the envelope in terms
of sexual indecency. There have been some problems of hate
speech. But this is a minor portion of what's been on these chan-
nels. Nonetheless, it's what attracts attention because it's news-
worthy.
What we at the Alliance like to talk about are the programming
13. 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1988).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
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for racial minorities, programming by and for foreign language
organizations. There's programming in Portuguese, Farsi, Vietnam-
ese, and other foreign languages. PEG access is a way to use this
medium for what's called "narrowcasting," rather than broadcast-
ing, and to target and be able to allow people within more limited
communities to be able to use this medium. So that's the purpose
for having these channels set aside.
Leased access is a little different. It is a way to say that pro-
grammers or people with a message who want to be able to use
cable for for-profit programming, but who don't have enough mon-
ey to be a broadcaster or are unable to sell their services to a cable
operator, have a vehicle to come in, pay a fee, and be able to put
their programming on.
The 1992 Cable Act reversed a provision in the 1984 Cable
Act 5 which had provided that cable operators could not exercise
any editorial control over any video programming provided over
access channels. Congress provided that these channels could be
set aside, and they said, all right, cable operators, you can't exer-
cise your editorial control.
In the 1992 Cable Act, Congress-not in any kind of reasoned
legislative judgment like we've heard about in the last panel, but
in floor amendments offered on the last day without any committee
consideration-passed a couple of amendments which required the
FCC to adopt regulations designed to (1) restrict access of children
to indecent programming on leased channels 6 and (2) to permit
cable operators to prohibit the use of PEG access facilities for any
programming, and I'm quoting the statutory language, "which con-
tains obscene material, sexually explicit conduct, or material solicit-
ing or promoting unlawful conduct."' 17 And if you think about
those words, none of those deals with areas of speech that are con-
stitutionally prohibited. It says "obscene material," it doesn't say
obscenity. Under the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity, you
15. 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2) (1988).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 5320)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).




can't know whether programming is obscene until you've seen it
in the entire context, and material which may be obscene in isola-
tion isn't obscene under the constitutional standards the courts have
developed over the years.
1 8
"Sexually explicit conduct" is a very, very broad phrase. Some
sexually explicit conduct may be obscene, but a lot of sexually
explicit conduct is constitutionally protected when in the form of
speech.19
And finally, "material soliciting or promoting unlawful con-
duct" means that you couldn't have programming that advocated
civil disobedience, for example, which is a form of speech that's
clearly protected.2 °
So, you had this provision by Congress, and the FCC-duly
responsive to what Congress required-issued notices of proposed
rulemaking as it was required to do under the 1992 Cable Act.
Comments were filed by a number of parties. The Alliance for
Community Media was joined by the ACLU, People for the Ameri-
can Way, and Alliance for Communications Democracy, which is
an organization of public access centers, in filing what were, by
far, the most extensive comments submitted to the FCC. We also
filed reply comments, elements of the cable industry filed com-
ments, and the FCC eventually came down with its regulations,21
which really didn't surprise us. The thrust of our comments was
that the FCC could do nothing in the way of coming up with regu-
lations that would survive constitutional scrutiny because the Act,
18. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) ("A state offense must ... be
limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which
portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not
have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." (emphasis added)).
19. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (nude danc-
ing); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (motion picture the-
aters); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (live theater perfor-
mances); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (bookstores),
20. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982).
21. In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and Com-
petition Act of 1992, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7709 (1992); First
Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 998 (1993); Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 2638
(1993).
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as we viewed it, was pretty well unconstitutional on its face, al-
though we suggested ways that the FCC might have been able to
construct regulations. Well, the FCC didn't. The PEG access
regulations it came up with said that "[a]ny cable operator may
prohibit the use on its system of any channel capacity [for PEG]
for any programming which contains obscene material, indecent
material . . . or material soliciting or promoting unlawful con-
duct., 2 2 So the FCC just picked up the language that was in the
statute because it's not going to run into any trouble with Congress
by picking up on it. They then said, "[f]or purposes of this section,
'material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct' shall mean ma-
terial that is otherwise proscribed by law. 23 What does that mean?
In the text of its order, but not the rules themselves, the FCC said,
well, this wouldn't reach civil disobedience but it would reach
other things. For example, it would reach speech advocating pros-
titution in states where prostitution was illegal. The FCC came up
with a couple of examples, but didn't come up with any kind of
rational distinction there.
And something that's more of a problem-and Marjorie will
get to this when she talks about it-the FCC regulations said that
"[a] cable operator may require any access user, or access manager
or administrator agreeing to assume the responsibility of certifying,
to certify that its programming does not contain any of the materi-
als described above and that reasonable efforts will be used to
ensure that live programming does not contain such material." 24
This is a provision that could have a seriously chilling effect on
speech.
The leased access regulations were somewhat different because
the provision dealing with leased access was different. The regu-
lations provided that a cable operator "may adopt and enforce pro-
spectively a written and published policy of prohibiting program-
ming which, it reasonably believes, [that is, the cable operator
reasonably believes] describes or depicts sexual or excretory activi-





ties or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by con-
temporary community standards, ' 25 which is kind of a test that's
been in the broadcast industry,26 but this was a complete ban on
such programming and not time channeling as we've seen in the
ACT [Action for Children's Television] 1,27 1128 and 11129 cases that
we'll be talking about later.
Then the regulations say that a cable operator that does not
elect to prohibit programming on the leased access channels "shall
place any leased access program identified by program provid-
ers"-in other words, those who have to incriminate them-
selves-"as indecent on one or more channels that are available to
subscribers only with their prior written consent., 30 So a program-
mer has to decide whether its programming is indecent, and if it's
indecent then it gets to be segregated onto this separate channel
and then the cable operator doesn't have to make that programming
available, except upon written request of the subscriber. It can take
up to 30 days to do that, which can eliminate a lot of time-sensitive
programming.31
Then the regulation says a program provider requesting access
shall identify programming that is indecent, and that "[a] program
provider requesting carriage of 'live programming' on a leased
access channel that is not identified as indecent must exercise rea-
sonable efforts to insure that indecent programming will not be
presented. 32
Then "[a] cable operator may request a program provider to
certify that the programming intended for leased access is not ob-
scene programming or indecent programming, ' 3 so you're getting
25. 47 C.F.R. § 76.701(a) (1993).
26. See, e.g., Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1335 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) [hereinafter ACT 1].
27. Id.
28. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992) [hereinafter ACT 11].
29. ACT 11, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
30. 47 C.F.R. § 76.701(b) (1993).
31. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.701(c) (1993).
32. 47 C.F.R. § 76.701(d) (1993).
33. 47 C.F.R. § 76.701(e) (1993).
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then into the chilling effect and self-incrimination.
Once the FCC came out with these regulations, we were pretty
quick in going to court to appeal them. The FCC had a single
rulemaking proceeding dealing with both kinds of access. Then it
issued the leased access rules earlier because it had an earlier time
deadline imposed by Congress. We went to court on leased access
and got those regulations stayed.34 Then we went to court on the
PEG access rules when those were issued, got those stayed, and
had the two consolidated,35 and the case was then argued. It was
briefed on a fast track and argued on a fast track. Then on No-
vember 23 of this past year, the court decided the case, and the
panel there unanimously found that both the leased access and PEG
access regulations should be rejected.36 The court had identified
two key constitutional questions under the challenges to those acts.
One is, can a government permit cable operators to be censors
of programming on access channels? 37 The second issue is, can the
government compel cable operators to place indecent leased access
programs on a separate channel blocked from viewing unless re-
quested in writing? 38
The court in Alliance started by pointing out as a prelude that
it's reiterating that indecent speech, as distinct from obscene
speech, is protected by the Constitution, so what we're dealing with
here is programming that is not constitutionally proscribed. 39 Be-
cause if it's obscene speech, it can be prevented, although only
under constitutional safeguards that certainly were not provided for
under these regulations.
The court pointed out, and I'm quoting, a "truly scientific pro-
34. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, No. 93-1169 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 1993)
(order).
35. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, No. 93-1169 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 1993)
(order).
36. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
37. Id. at 816.
38. Id. at 817.
39. Id.; cf. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (striking down




gram... that discusses the prevention of life-threatening diseases
through the use of condoms could perhaps be considered 'indecent'
but would hardly seem to lack the scientific or social value so as
to lose protection under the First Amendment., 40 So the court was
focusing on the really broad sweep of what the FCC had come up
with as it had been directed to do by Congress.
The government's main argument was that this wasn't state
action, that all it was doing was allowing cable operators to act as
editors and as censors.4' It's the kind of argument that the folks
from Time Warner, who were on either end of the second panel,
think is wonderful, and it's kind of the cable industry's view that
yes, it's our channel and you can't take anything away.
We heard discussion earlier in the first panel by Andrew
Merdek, who came up with seven kinds of First Amendment analy-
ses; actually there's an eighth which he didn't talk about, and that's
a public park. We view public access like a public park. If you
have a building developer who is required to set aside some green
space for the public to use, that's really what public access is like.
I think it's a traditional public forum, but in any event, it's clearly
a designated public forum entitled to protection. With leased ac-
cess, you've got something that's a form of common carriage.
While cable operators aren't common carriers under the 1984 and
1992 Cable Acts, the leased access provision is really saying that,
as to this certain portion of your spectrum, you're going to be a
common carrier, and you have common carriage obligations.
Cable operators say, well gee, we had this all in the first place,
and we're just being allowed to program it. But that really defeats
the whole thrust of what's involved here. If you accept that argu-
ment, it's no longer common carriage, or it's certainly no longer a
public forum, because you're allowing cable operators to be edi-
tors. And what the court was able to perceive-which I don't
think was very difficult to understand-is you had the govern-
ment's fingerprints all over this. Government defined what inde-
cent speech was; the government said that you can censor this kind
40. Alliance, 10 F.3d at 817 n.3.
41. Id. at 817-22.
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of speech, but you can't censor other kinds of speech. You can
only censor this kind of speech that we, the government, don't
particularly like-and that could be civil disobedience, and it could
be programming that's indecent which is really sexually explicit,
as the FCC defined it. Perhaps what is most pernicious is the pro-
vision that removed the cable operators' statutory immunity under
the 1984 Cable Act from liability for access programming insofar
as it "involves obscene material., 42 This provision places cable
operators in peril of civil or criminal liability if they fail to use
their newly-granted authority to censor.
What's even worse-and this gets into kind of an equal protec-
tion argument that's at play in the leased access consideration43_is
that it's the kind of programming that cable operators don't keep
out of the programming they choose to put on. How many of you
get HBO and have seen the program, "Real Sex"? Well "Real
Sex" is much more sexually explicit than a lot of what's com-
plained about that has appeared on leased access or public access
channels. The afternoon soaps contain sexually explicit program-
ming as defined by the FCC, so you've got the kind of program-
ming that the cable operator will allow on itself, but is permitted
to censor when done by these other speakers who are there to offer
diversity.
The court did remand to the FCC the question on leased access
of whether this equal protection issue would be alleviated if other
commercial programming were subject to similar segregation and
blocking requirements."
Let me kind of stop here, except by giving you one final little
update which is a little bit disturbing, and that's that the govern-
ment asked for a rehearing en banc, and the court has asked for a
response by the petitioners in that case on whether or not a rehear-
ing en banc should be granted. That's obviously not a good sign.
The court has not granted rehearing, and we're not sure what's
42. Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 10(d), 106 Stat. at 1486 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 558
(1988)).
43. See Alliance, 10 F.3d at 824-25.
44. Id. at 829-30.
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driving the court. The same panel, which consists of the only three
Democrats that sit on the D.C. Circuit,45 had two other newsworthy
decisions. One was the broadcasting indecency case,46 and the
other was the Steffan case involving the gay midshipman who was
dismissed from Annapolis,47 and on all three of those there was a
unanimous decision by this panel where the court has asked for
responses on whether it should reconsider en banc.48 Maybe I'll
stop there and let Marjorie pick it up later.
MR. SITCOV: I need to make a couple of disclaimers before
I begin. One is, as the other Justice people who spoke here today
have also said, my views are not necessarily the views of the Jus-
tice Department or the Attorney General or the FCC. And the
second disclaimer is that I am going to talk about the role of the
FCC with respect to indecency, and its regulation of indecency, and
I guess I would just say it's a double whammy, my disclaimer with
respect to that part of my talk.
The FCC's view with respect to indecency is, of course, formu-
lated in large measure by what Congress tells it to do. Congress
at one time, as you just heard, told the FCC that it shouldn't allow
indecency in the broadcast media. And that didn't fly with the
courts.
In the cable context, the FCC is attempting essentially to apply
the Pacifica49 decision. One thing that I think is necessary to keep
in mind, if you read Pacifica-as I re-read it yesterday-is that the
case was the result of the complaint of a single citizen who was
offended by the Carlin monologue, notwithstanding the disclaimer
that the broadcaster of the Carlin monologue put on before the
45. The three Democrats are Chief Judge Abner Mikva and Judges Patricia Wald and
Harry Edwards.
46. ACT III, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
47. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
48. [Eds. note: On February 16, 1994, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the judgments in Alliance for Community Media and ACT
III and ordered that the cases be reheard by the court sitting en banc. Alliance for Com-
munity Media v. FCC, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994).]
49. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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monologue was aired. The government's view is generally that it
does have a role to play in protecting minors from indecency, and
Congress has certainly made it clear that it views that in the cable
context as well.
The real issue in the cable area is not whether there should be
a safe harbor, but what the limitations of that safe harbor should
be. Specifically, should it be from midnight till 6:00? From 10:00
until 6:30? From 10:30 until 6:00? Those are issues which, I
think it's safe to say, the government views as, in general, being
best resolved by the administrative agency that is charged with the
enforcement of the statutes that govern the cable industry. None-
theless, there's unquestionably a role that the courts are going to
play. It seems to me that one of the problems that has been atten-
dant upon cable action by the government in the past-and it cer-
tainly is reflected in at least the decision in ACT 11S0 and perhaps
in a related manner in the Quincy Cable case,51 and Century52 as
well, which dealt with "must carry" as a regulation-is that often-
times, there are either thin legislative records or thin administrative
records to support government action. We don't believe that in
ACT III, the record was thin, and that is the purpose for which we
have sought reconsideration.
As far as the FCC's role is concerned, as the agency that is
primarily responsible for discharging the government's responsibili-
ties in the area of cable television, the FCC must not only take its
cue from Congress in the literal word of the statutes it's required
to enforce, but it also must rely heavily on the involvement of
citizens through the complaint process and through notice and com-
ment rulemaking.
I know that there has been a bitter back-and-forth on this issue,
not just in court, but through the administrative process as well.
I think it's really quite difficult, at least at this point, to project
50. ACT II, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
51. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1169 (1986).
52. Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988).
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what the outcome will be, given that there is a re-hearing petition.
Even if the re-hearing petition is denied and cert is not sought, or
cert is sought and the FCC were to lose, there still will be a back-
to-the-drawing-board problem for the FCC in articulating exactly
what that safe harbor will be. I suppose it's anybody's guess at
this point what they would select historically. I think the ACT II
decision talked about the 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. period as being the
historic safe harbor period.53 Whether it would be a return to that,
I simply don't know.
On the issue of whether or not indecent speech is speech that
ought to be controlled in that way is a matter-it seems to me-for
Congress, and having spoken on the issue, I don't know that the
FCC has much to do other than carrying out the traditional admin-
istrative function of taking what evidence it can, administratively
reaching whatever expert administrative conclusions it can reach,
and then attempting to implement them. Given the sensitivity of
this type of fare, there's no doubt that whatever decision the FCC
reaches, there will be dissatisfaction on both sides, and it's not an
issue that's likely to be settled without at least a lot more furor one
way or the other.
PROFESSOR FLEMING: The assumption that you seem to
make is that there will be a safe harbor, and the question is, when
will it be? Is that an assumption that you share?
MR. SITCOV: Well, remember, I say that without the authori-
ty of the Commission to say that. But I think it's safe to say that
there would be a safe harbor of some type.
PROFESSOR FLEMING: Is it conceivable that the safe harbor
would be even narrower?
MR. SITCOV: Well, at least in ACT II, the court of appeals
had discussed the safe harbor as having been 10 until 6, I believe,
but the problem in ACT II was that Congress had eliminated the
safe harbor. The D.C. Circuit struck down Congress' 24-hour ban
and said go back to the drawing board.54 So, I don't doubt that
53. See ACT I, 932 F.2d at 1506.
54. Id. at 1510.
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there will be a safe harbor, and my guess is that it will probably be
pretty close to what has been acceptable, or at least appeared to
have been acceptable in the past.
PROFESSOR FLEMING: Well, maybe we could use this issue
as a transition to Marjorie Heins. Do you share the assumption
that there will be a safe harbor?
MS. HEINS: No. But first I should tell you what ACT I, II,
and III are for those of you who don't know. ACT stands for
Action for Children's Television which, by virtue of its beginning
with an "A," has been the lead plaintiff in a whole series of law-
suits which have been going on for almost ten years now, over
what, if any, safe harbor is appropriate for the FCC to set for the
broadcast of so-called indecent material on broadcast television and
radio. The notion of regulating indecency in the electronic media
and establishing a safe harbor period-usually late at night, during
which so-called indecency can be aired-has been strictly limited
to broadcast-until the 1992 Cable Act, which Jim talked
about-and the FCC had no power to censor indecency or channel
it to late night hours on cable. The 1992 Cable Act attempted to
change that, but as Jim pointed out, the indecency provisions of the
Act were struck down in the Alliance case last year.
MR. SITCOV: But they only tried to change it for the access
channel.
MS. HEINS: True, that's pretty much true. I think that the
ACT III decision casts doubt on whether the FCC can set any re-
striction on indecency at all, in the absence of its ability (and it's
now tried three times) to come up with an administrative record
justifying what is, in essence, censorship by the Federal Govern-
ment of constitutionally protected speech. And part of the reason
for that is in the Pacifica decision, which Michael Sitcov men-
tioned, the Supreme Court in a split decision with a plurality did
uphold the FCC's definition of indecency, which you've heard
mentioned in the context of cable, but it's essentially the same for
broadcast. The FCC came up with this definition which basically
derives from one of the three prongs of the Miller v. California
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obscenity test.5 But it's only one prong, and it's the "patently
offensive depiction or description of sexual or excretory activities
or organs" in a manner that's considered patently offensive "as
measured by contemporary community standards," and in the con-
text of Pacifica, it was contemporary standards for the radio broad-
cast medium. That's very vague and subjective, I think you'll
agree, and I should correct myself a little bit because I don't think
the plurality in Pacifica really upheld that definition. What they
did was they upheld the application of an indecency standard to the
George Carlin famous filthy words monologue, and if you want to
know what it was, you can look at the Pacifica decision and it's all
set out there in all its filthiness and humor and satiric value.56
MR. SITCOV: I don't think there's much doubt that the D.C.
Circuit thinks that the Supreme Court thought that it was at least
defining.
MS. HEINS: Yes, well that certainly was true in ACT I. Ruth
Bader Ginsberg wrote the decision I think, and she said, we think
the Supreme Court upheld the indecency standard, but if we're
wrong we defer to "Higher Authority": they can correct us. 57 And
now she's up there, so maybe she'll have something more to say
about it.
But what happened about six or seven years after Pacifica was
that the FCC had this broad standard, but they initially interpreted
it only to apply to the seven dirty words. And so broadcasters at
least knew you could talk about sex as long as you didn't use those
words. You used circumlocutions instead.
What the FCC did in the mid-1980s was vastly expand-it's
55. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average
person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. (quotation omitted).
56. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751-55 (1978).
57. ACT 1, 852 F.2d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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probably fair to say, under pressure from a right-wing "social val-
ues" type of administration and powerful radical right-wing politi-
cal pressure being placed on agencies in the federal govern-
ment-their definition from the "seven dirty words" to virtually
anything that they in their infinite wisdom decided was offensive.
And what's patently offensive to a gay rights activist on the Lower
East Side of Manhattan is not the same as the thing that's patently
offensive to a Baptist minister in a little town in Oklahoma, and
you've got as many definitions of what's patently offensive as you
do Americans. So the FCC really expanded it to something that
was so subjective and unpredictable that it created a lot of prob-
lems for broadcasters and viewers. That standard, in conjunction
with the various different safe harbors that either the FCC has
decided upon or Congress has imposed on the FCC, has really been
under challenge since the very first ACT case which was decided
in 198858 and each time right up to the present with the decision in
ACT III in November of last year. There, the D.C. Circuit said,
FCC, you have not met the constitutional burden of justification of
what is, in fact, censorship of constitutionally protected material,
and you have to go back and prove your case.5 9 In ACT III in
particular, there's some very strong language about the First
Amendment rights of adults and older minors to have access to, to
talk about, to receive information about, sexual matters,6 such as
the safe sex condom information that was particularly mentioned
in the Alliance decision in the passage that Jim read.
FCC, you haven't considered that this is content-based regula-
tion. You have to meet a strict scrutiny standard, and you have to
establish that the compelling interest-which we concede is com-
pelling in protecting minors from so-called indecency-is being
served by the narrowest possible regulations that adequately take
into consideration the First Amendment rights of adults and older
minors. And frankly, I don't think the FCC can compile a record
that will meet that standard-and they certainly haven't yet-so
58. ACT 1, 852 F.2d 1332.
59. ACT III, 11 F.3d at 182-83.
60. Id. at 181-82.
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there is a lively difference of opinion as to whether they can con-
stitutionally be in the business of censoring indecency.
MR. SITCOV: I think that you really have to think about the
decision in Beach,6 where the Supreme Court made it pretty clear
that it didn't think the D.C. Circuit ought to be doing the kind of
review of rulemaking that it kept doing in that case. That was
another cable TV situation, and it seems to me, therefore, that
Beach is a rather compelling basis upon which one could argue that
the D.C. Circuit's decision in ACT III goes far beyond what would
be the appropriate role of a reviewing court considering an admin-
istrative determination within the area of expertise of an agency
charged by Congress to do something.
MS. HEINS: The major distinction is that Beach Communica-
tions, a decision of the Supreme Court last year, was about cable
regulation, but it had nothing to do with content. It wasn't a cen-
sorship case. And the difference is that the FCC has no expertise
in deciding what's patently offensive. In fact, when it comes to
speech, the First Amendment says, "Congress shall make no law
.... ,62 so the federal government shouldn't be in the business of
deciding what people can and can't have access to.
MR. SITCOV: But the court never said that the FCC cannot
consider what is appropriate speech for purposes of indecency, and
so you have to start from the assumption that at least the Court has
accepted the fact that Congress views the FCC as the appropriate
repository for the government's administrative expertise in this
area, and I think that it's not unlikely that the Supreme Court might
agree with that view.
MS. HEINS: Well, time will tell.
Let me go back a little bit, because we sort of got started in the
middle.
As was mentioned, I'm director of a little project at the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") called the Arts Censorship
Project, which got started in early 1991, basically in response, not
61. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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to anything the FCC was doing, but to the attacks on the National
Endowment for the Arts. I'm sure you can remember televised
images of Senator D'Amato angrily tearing up pictures of Andres
Serrano's Piss Christ, and a big flap about Mapplethorpe and per-
formance artists like Karen Finley, and a lot of attacks on the agen-
cy, and attempts to impose restrictions on the kind of art that the
agency should be funding.63
And the other thing that was happening in those days, and is
still happening to some extent, were attacks on rap music. Now if
you go back to the mid 1980s, we had Tipper Gore and the attacks
on rock music64-that it was making our children into drug addicts
and so forth. Of course, attacks on popular music go way back
even before Tipper Gore, but the most recent incarnation has been
the attack on rap, both for violent imagery and lyrics and for miso-
gynist imagery and lyrics. In 1990, there were actual criminal
obscenity prosecutions against rap musicians and music stores that
sold their works65 and also against a museum, as you remember, in
Cincinnati for showing the traveling retrospective exhibition of
Robert Mapplethorpe's works.66 There was a censorship problem,
and the ACLU got around to creating this project.
What I discovered once I got there was that, in addition to
those censorship issues involving music and government funding
and all the kinds of complicated constitutional analysis you go
through-I can see Ted Hirt writing this all down-about what
63. See, e.g., John Koch, Spitball Politics Distorts the NEA, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
5, 1992, at 73; William H. Honan, Endowment Embattled Over Academic Freedom, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1989, at 42; Michael Wingfield Walker, Artistic Freedom v. Censorship:
The Aftermath of the NEA's New Funding Restrictions, 17 WASH. U. L.Q. 937 (1993).
64. Tipper Gore was a leader of the Parents Music Resource Center ("PMRC")
which, in 1985, took its concerns regarding the possible negative impact of rock music
lyrics to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Senate
hearings were held to bring this issue to the attention of the public at large. See Contents
of Music and Lyrics of Records: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
65. Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd
in part sub nom. Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 659 (1992).
66. Contemporary Arts Ctr. v. Ney, 735 F. Supp. 743 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
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limitations the First Amendment imposes on content-based restric-
tions on government benefit or funding programs, there was this
whole issue with the FCC and censorship, of so-called indecency.
And I must admit I was pretty amazed when I began to read some
of these cases and think about the fact that as far as I know, the
FCC is the only federal agency that is currently existing as a cen-
sorship board, deciding what Americans shall be allowed to broad-
cast and hear and see on what is acknowledged to be the major
medium of communication these days.
So I started getting into this area, and although some people
may say that the notion of arts, which is my turf, and television are
mutually contradictory, in fact one thing I've discovered is there's
a lot of good art on television, and partly that's been a result of
being educated by people like Jim and the Alliance for Community
Media and the public access and leased access programmers out
there. They're cable, they're not broadcast. They are communicat-
ing some very interesting and provocative work, and as Jim pointed
out, these are the access channels. These are the folks who do not
have mega-bucks behind them to produce mass entertainment. I'm
basically a '60s person, and if any of you go back that far, I think
of some of these access programmers as the Liberation News Ser-
vice of the electronic media. The leased access programmer that
we represented in the Alliance case is an outfit called "The '90s
Channel," which puts on innovative features that sometimes dis-
agree with U.S. foreign policy, that have radical critiques of social
and economic government policies, that have sexually explicit ma-
terial, but it's not your typical mainstream, heterosexual male soft
porn. The sexually explicit material on these access channels often
tends to be gay in orientation or radical feminist in orientation, and
I'll give you some examples of that a little later.
There's a lot of information in the record that was compiled
before the commission in the Alliance case about the innovative
value of some of the access programming that is, as Jim men-
tioned, the only kind of programming that is subject to FCC cen-
sorship under section 10 of the 1992 Cable Act. As I discovered
in my work in other areas of censorship, so in the area of the
FCC's regulation of indecency, it's sex that does seem to be the
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major issue, always has been, in terms of censoring arts and enter-
tainment in the United States. In other countries they're more
concerned about politically radical subversives; you know, the IRA
can't speak on British television. In some societies where there is
no separation of church and state, it's blasphemy: you not only
have your government funding removed, you can be stoned to
death if your art or entertainment-or if your novel-is blasphe-
mous.
In the United States that would be clearly unconstitutional, but
we still have this thing about sex. Not only do we have the ob-
scenity exception to the First Amendment, where if some court or
jury in its infinite wisdom decides that sexually explicit material
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, you can
go to jail for that.67 But we also have this indecency which is
constitutionally protected material, but what has happened, since I
think at least the 1960s, is that the Supreme Court started putting
limitations on obscenity law and saying you cannot punish people
for creating, producing, distributing sexually explicit information,
art, entertainment, unless you can really show, in the language of
the 1973 Miller case, that the work lacks "serious value." (The
original test was that it was "utterly without redeeming social val-
ue."68) The government had that burden before it could criminalize
or prohibit or suppress sexually explicit art or entertainment. That
was a rather hard burden to meet, and in fact, the government was
unable to meet it in the rap music prosecutions I mentioned earlier,
certainly was unable to meet it in the Mapplethorpe case, and is
often unable to meet it in straight prosecutions of pornography.
So, to avoid the difficulties of proving obscenity, the govern-
ment and those who have a problem with sexual explicitness in the
arts have adopted this indecency standard. And although the Su-
preme Court has said repeatedly that indecency, because it is not
the same as obscenity, is constitutionally protected, nevertheless, all
this regulation has been allowed to proliferate, the FCC being the
67. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
68. See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 418-19 (1966).
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most conspicuous example of a government board censoring art
and entertainment with sexual content. But also, in the context of
federal arts funding, as I mentioned, Congress passed a law a cou-
ple of years ago requiring that National Endowment for the Arts
grants comply with "general standards of decency and respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." 69 "Respect
for diverse beliefs and values" is sort of the "blasphemy" part of
the test, which I think is quite clearly unconstitutional. But "gener-
al standards of decency" has its roots in FCC law. So the notion
of decency as this vehicle for censorship-to circumvent the re-
quirements of obscenity law-is certainly something that we're
confronting in a lot of areas.
Let me just wind up by telling you a few war stories, talking
about a couple of cases that I've been involved in around the coun-
try that really I see flowing from the 1992 Cable Act. The Act, as
Jim mentioned, for the first time took the FCC indecency defini-
tion, messed with it a little, changed it from contemporary commu-
nity standards for the broadcast medium, to contemporary standards
for the cable medium, and applied it to cable access channels.7"
Now, one might argue that standards for cable are more liberal than
broadcast standards, because there's so much variety on cable and
it's been previously unregulated.
As Jim mentioned, section 10, with its convoluted scheme for
censoring so-called indecency (which Congress pretty much knew
it couldn't do directly), tried to deputize cable operators, who Con-
gress knew didn't like access channels anyway, to do the censoring
for them. Section 10(b) said to cable operators: if you don't de-
cide to censor from your access channels everything that you rea-
sonably believe is indecent, we're going to impose these burden-
some regulations. 7' The programmers have to certify whether or
not their material is indecent, which as Jim mentioned, has a rather
sobering, chilling effect. As in any kind of vague and overbroad
69. See Finley v. NEA, 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (amendment to NEA
grant-making procedures requiring "general standards of decency" violated First Amend-
ment by encroaching upon protected expression).
70. See 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
71. See 47 U.S.C. § 5320) (Supp. IV 1992).
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certification scheme or loyalty oath type of situation, the produc-
ers-the creative people-will steer wide of what they consider
might get them into trouble and will censor themselves, and we
will all lose, both the creative people and the viewers. The receiv-
ers of information will lose from that certification requirement, so
section 10(b) said that to the extent that the cable operator, and this
is for only leased access, doesn't censor all that it reasonably be-
lieves is indecent, then the cable operator will have to require the
certifications from programmers, and anything that is not certified
as decent has to go on a special locked, blocked channel that you
can only get if you are brave enough to write down that you want
it and affirmatively request it. That's certainly going to cut down
on the viewing audience for this type of programming.
Now, both sections 10(a) and (b), and section (c)-which is the
censorship provision for public access or PEG access-were all
struck down in the Alliance case,72 but meanwhile what happened
is I started getting phone calls about cable censorship from all
around the country. Usually something was broadly defined as
indecent-sometimes it was by the cable operator, and sometimes
it was by the municipality, and sometimes it was by the public
access center, which was supposed to be deputized by the munici-
pality as the people who would administer this public forum, this
green space for freedom of speech for access that Jim mentioned.
And sometimes they all got together and went after some particular
program that they considered offensive and didn't want.
One example is a case in which we just filed an amicus brief,
in San Francisco of all places. 73 Now you would think if there's
any place in the country where nothing is patently offensive by
contemporary community standards, it would be San Francisco, but
Viacom disagreed, and Viacom is the cable operator of the system
in San Francisco and has long been resisting the very notion of
public access. They have never even turned over the public access
function to the public access non-profit center, which their fran-
72. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993).




chise agreement required them to do, so they've been running it
themselves, and over the course of the last year or so, they have
pulled two public access programs because somebody-usually just
the engineer who's watching the thing as it is being aired--decides
that there's a penis somewhere in this picture. It may not even be
a sexual scene, but one of Viacom's rules was that they won't have
any indecency, and they defined any nudity as indecency, and they
also defined any gross language referring to sexual activities as
indecency. So there are very broad standards, and we are arguing
in this case that even the 1992 Cable Act doesn't authorize that
kind of censorship. In fact, section 10 of the 1992 Cable Act, the
indecency provisions, have been struck down in Alliance, so
Viacom certainly has no basis for refusing to permit this material
on public access, and in fact is directly violating the provisions of
the 1984 Cable Act, which as Jim mentioned, prohibit cable opera-
tors from exercising any editorial control over access channels.
The other show that is at issue in the Viacom case in San Fran-
cisco is a show called "Erotica SF," and again it is not your stan-
dard Playboy Channel-type pornography. What it is is a sort of
radical-what they call out in the Bay area "sex posi-
tive"--documentary and feature program on what you might call
sexual minority kinds of activities, and the particular segment of
"Erotica SF" that Viacom just decided was not acceptable to them
was footage of the Fetishists' Ball. I guess that's a big deal out in
San Francisco, and everybody comes dressed up in whatever their
favorite fetish costume is. And you know, it's campy, and I'm
sure there's a lot of cross-dressing and everything else going on.
I haven't seen it, but it is certainly not your standard porn, it repre-
sents the views of a minority community, and as we have argued
all along, if you don't like it, you don't have to tune it in, or if
you've got it tuned in, you can switch the dial, or if you're afraid
your kid might be harmed for life by seeing a minute of the Fetish-
ists' Ball, you can get a lock-box and lock it out when you're not
home. And that has always been the acceptable, least restrictive
alternative form of helping parents protect their children if they feel
this is what their children are in need of protection from.
I'll just mention one more case to drive home the point that
1994]
826 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
what gets censored through the FCC's indecency regulations is
often the non-mainstream, provocative, radical material that doesn't
really get a voice in the media otherwise, and this is a case out of
Colorado.74 And this one, I'm sorry to say, arose as a result of
censorship by the cable access center itself, the people who are
established as a non-profit and delegated by the City of Denver
with the mission of administering the electronic public forum that
the 1984 Cable Act created for access channels. Denver Communi-
ty Television, the public access administrator in Denver, decided
that a program called "Gay Lesbian Magazine," produced by a gay
rights activist and theater director in Denver, was not even inde-
cent, but obscene. Of course, they didn't consult any lawyers-or
if they did, the lawyers hadn't read any Supreme Court cases re-
cently-because the program that they were concerned about was
very, very far from any definition of obscenity. It didn't have
nudity, it didn't have any sex acts, and certainly Denver Communi-
ty Television did not follow what are the constitutionally required
procedures, which meant going to court before you impose a prior
restraint and censor something because you think it's obscene.
"GL Magazine," in this particular segment, consisted of two talking
heads, two guys having a talk show conversation about gay rights,
and there were cutaways to a film that had actually been broadcast
in a previous edition of the show which was, from my point of
view, not great art, but it basically showed some guys all clad in
leather gyrating in a leather bar, and that was it.
So my point is that it is very often the minority viewpoint and
what would be considered unconventional sexual politics-pro-
gramming that definitely has a message-that gets censored under
this rubric of indecency once you let it fly out into the world.
So let me end for now, subject to further interrogation.
PROFESSOR FLEMING: Marjorie has observed that many of
our censorship wars center on sex. Robert Perry has been involved
in litigation that also has involved censorship through denial of
access to dissident political groups espousing hateful ideas, such as
74. Palange v. Denver Community Television, Inc., No. 93-CV-84429 (Dist. Ct.
Denver County filed Aug. 16, 1993).
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the Ku Klux Klan. He has also been involved in cases involving
censorship of rock music. Robert.
MR. PERRY: I'd like to add a few comments on the censor-
ship of sexually explicit programming over leased and public ac-
cess channels, if time permits. But first, let me briefly discuss the
censorship of controversial political programming, including what
might be classified as "hate speech," over access channels, because
I view the latter censorship as even more troubling than the censor-
ship of sexually explicit programming over access channels.75
The most notable example of the censorship of controversial
political programming over public access channels occurred in
Kansas City, Missouri in the late 1980s, where a cable franchise
had been awarded in 1979 to American Cablevision of Kansas
City, Inc. ("ACV").76 Under the 1979 cable franchise, ACV was
required to set aside one channel for public access programming
(which became Channel 20) and was also required to provide pub-
lic access producers with production equipment facilities and staff
75. I do not mean to suggest that sexually explicit and controversial political pro-
gramming are mutually exclusive categories. Indeed, there is a long tradition of mixing
sexually explicit materials with core political speech. During the French Revolution, for
example, a print entitled Grand DeBandement de L'Armee Anticonstitutionelle appeared
in an ultra-royalist newspaper. It portrayed Austrian troops dispersing because several
women with revolutionary sympathies had lifted their skirts and disrespectfully displayed
their buttocks. The title contains several puns deriving from the various meanings of
debander, which include "to disband" and "to lose one's erection." Vivian Cameron,
Political Exposures: Sexuality and Caricature in the French Revolution in EROTICISM
AND THE BODY POLITIC 90-95 (Lynn Hunt ed., 1991); see generally THE INVENTION OF
PORNOGRAPHY: OBSCENITY AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERNITY, 1500-1800 (Lynn Hunt
ed., 1993).
76. ACV was initially a wholly owned subsidiary of American Television and Com-
munications Corporation ("ATC"), which by the late 1980s had become the second largest
multiple system operator ("MSO") in the United States. ATC was itself a wholly owned
subsidiary of Time, Inc. Following the merger of Time, Inc. and Warner Communica-
tions, Inc. ("Warner") in 1989, ATC and Warner Cable, Inc., Warner's own MSO, were
consolidated into a single MSO called Warner Cable, which remains the second largest
MSO in the United States. CABLEVISION, June 7, 1993, at 126. In 1985, Telecommuni-
cations, Inc. ("TCI"), the nation's largest MSO, id., acquired 50 percent of ACV's owner-
ship. Thus, by the late 1980s, ACV was jointly owned by the two largest MSO's in the
United States. At the time, ACV ranked as the nation's twenty-sixth largest single cable
system, in terms of total number of basic cable subscribers; today, it is the twenty-eighth
single largest cable system in the country. Id. at 127.
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assistance free of charge."
In August 1987, several representatives of the Missouri
Knights, an unincorporated association of individuals espousing a
"racialist" viewpoint that opposed racial integration, contacted ACV
officials and requested a weekly time slot on Channel 20 to air a
public access series of 45 programs collectively entitled "Race and
Reason" and hosted by Tom Metzger, a nationally known organizer
of the Ku Klux Klan and former Grand Dragon of the California
Knights. During the mid- to late-1980s, "Race and Reason" had
aired on many public access channels around the United States,
seldom drawing much attention from the local community. While
virtually all public access coordinators and cable officials were
uncomfortable with the racist viewpoints expressed in "Race and
Reason," very few attempted to censor that programming from
public access channels because such censorship would have violat-
ed the policy goal underlying public access channel requirements
in cable franchises, which is to create electronic public fora in local
communities. Instead of censoring "Race and Reason," access
coordinators around the country typically aired counterprogram-
ming that challenged the racist viewpoints expressed in "Race and
Reason."
The Missouri Knights' request for a weekly time slot to air
"Race and Reason" was, however, denied by ACV officials, who
told them that only locally produced programs could air on Chan-
77. Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, Mo., 723 F. Supp. 1347,
1349 (W.D. Mo. 1989). The 1979 franchise actually required ACV to offer thirty-two
channels of cable programming, including four "public channels" reserved for use by the
public at no charge. Two of these public channels were reserved for educational pro-
gramming, the third for cultural programming, and the last for general public access use.
None of these public channels could be eliminated without the prior written approval of
the Kansas City Council. Nevertheless, even though required to provide separate public
channels for cultural programming and general public access use, ACV created a single
channel, Channel 20, for both uses. Id. Moreover, Channel 20 was not even available
on a full-time basis for public access programming because ACV preempted weekends
to air a national, home-shopping network. The Kansas City City Council acquiesced in
these and other breaches of ACV's public access obligations during the 1980s. Ironically,
the Council had selected ACV in 1979 over other applicants for the de facto exclusive




nel 20. In fact, there was no such rule precluding non-local pro-
gramming from airing on Channel 20, and, indeed, non-local pro-
gramming regularly aired on that public access channel.7" Nonethe-
less, the Missouri Knights did not dispute the ACV officials but
instead requested a weekly time slot on Channel 20 to air locally
produced programming which espoused the Knights' racist view-
point. ACV officials responded that the Knights' members would
first have to be trained by ACV personnel before they could use
Channel 20's production facilities and equipment. This too was a
pretext.79 Nevertheless, the Missouri Knights agreed to undergo
such training, which, needless to say, was delayed for many months
so that ACV could mount a public relations campaign to eliminate
Kansas City's only public access channel.8"
In late January 1988, a local group called the Concerned Citi-
zens for Decency held a press conference at Kansas City City Hall
to protest the Missouri Knights' planned use of Channel 20 to air
their locally produced, racist programming. ACV's Director of
Public Affairs attended that press conference and publicly stated
that ACV desired not to carry the Missouri Knights' public access
programming. Over the next several months, members of the Con-
cerned Citizens for Decency and ACV officials privately met with
members of the Kansas City City Council to consider how to keep
the Missouri Knight off ACV's cable channels. This ultimately led
to the Council's passage in mid-June 1988 of a resolution modify-
ing ACV's cable franchise to authorize the cable operator to delete
78. Satellite-delivered public access programming from Deep Dish regularly aired
on Channel 20. In addition, ACV regularly aired a national home-shopping network over
Channel 20 on weekends.
79. Although its cable franchise obligated ACV to provide formal training in the use
of Channel 20 production facilities and equipment, such training had been sporadically
provided during the 1980s. Indeed, the training coordinator's position was left vacant
after May 1986. In the absence of a formal training program and training coordinator,
new public access producers were simply "trained" by existing producers.
80. In Kansas City, the public access channel and studio facilities and equipment
were administered by the cable operator's employees. In many cities, however, the cable
franchise designates a community access organization ("CAO") to handle such administra-
tive responsibilities. Even CAO staff have been known to invoke nonexistent or long-
ignored rules to censor public access programming they dislike. See infra note 115 and
accompanying text.
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its public access channel."1 Although the resolution was content-
neutral on its face, the legislative history made unmistakably clear
that it had been passed for the sole purpose of suppressing the
Missouri Knight's viewpoint.8 2
Shortly thereafter, ACV formally eliminated the public access
channel in Kansas City. Although it continued to carry locally
produced programming that had aired on Channel 20 prior to pas-
sage of the June 1988 resolution, ACV increased its editorial con-
trol of such programming on its newly created "community pro-
gramming channel. 83  In August 1988, it denied the Missouri
Knights' request for a regular time slot.84 The Knights were, how-
ever, not the only speakers censored from ACV community pro-
gramming channel. In addition, ACV also refused to air Kent
Teel's proposed documentary on Leonard Peltier, the Indian rights
activist imprisoned following conviction for the murder of two FBI
agents in 1975.85
Thus, elimination of Kansas City's public access channel and
81. Missouri Knights, 723 F. Supp. at 1349-50.
82. The Kansas City City Council did not even provide a stated objective in the reso-
lution authorizing ACV to delete the public access channel. Kansas City, Mo., City
Council Res. No. 62655 (adopted June 16, 1988). A resolution authorizing ACV to delete
the public access channel had first been introduced on April 22, 1988, shortly after the
City Council had received a letter from ACV's president proposing elimination of the
channel to ensure that morally objectionable programming was not aired on local cable
channels. The entire City Council debate on the proposal to delete the public access
channel focused on the "Klan" problem. See, e.g., City Puts Reins on Klan on TV:
Council Vote Ends Public Access Channel, KAN. CITY TIMES, June 17, 1988, at 1.
83. In mid-July 1988, ACV modified its channel lineup, repositioning all public
access programming from Channel 20 to Channel 30, which became ACV's "community
programming channel." Most, but not all, public access programs that had aired on
Channel 20 continued to air on Channel 30, albeit no longer as a matter of right but rather
at ACV's discretion.
84. ACV did, however, offer the Missouri Knights the opportunity to appear as
guests on a one-time basis on either of two other weekly community programs. The
invitation was deemed unacceptable by the Knights because the format of each program
severely restricted the Knights' opportunity for self-expression.
85. Mr. Teel had previously produced a public access show on Peltier, whose claim
that he was wrongfully convicted has drawn considerable public support. The prior
documentary had aired on Channel 20. ACV, however, denied approval for production
and airing of the new documentary on Peltier because ACV officials deemed that Mr.
Teel's proposal did not sufficiently reflect the FBI perspective.
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return of the channel to ACV's private control not only resulted in
suppression of the Missouri Knights' racist viewpoint but also had
a ripple effect, creating the real possibility. that all controversial
political programming would henceforth be suppressed from cable
channels in Kansas City. One might analogize the events in Kan-
sas City in 1988 to a decision privatizing Central Park to ensure
that no controversial political rallies are held in the Park.86
Needless to say, the community of public access producers in
Kansas City was greatly dismayed by the elimination of the local
public access channel, but most access producers were in no posi-
tion to bring a lawsuit challenging that elimination. While these
producers clearly had standing to file such a lawsuit, not only did
they, individually and collectively, lack the resources to bring such
a lawsuit, but most were reluctant to bring any suit that might,
even if only superficially, suggest their support for the racist view-
point expressed by the Missouri Knights. The ACLU's local affili-
ate found a Kansas City attorney who agreed to represent the
Knights in a legal challenge to the Kansas City City Council's
elimination of the public access channel. But when the local press
reported that he had agreed to take the case, his partners, who had
not been consulted, asked him to leave the firm.
At that point, I was asked by the ACLU to assist several other
attorneys in representing the Knights in a legal challenge to the
Kansas City City Council's action. After much deliberation, we
filed a lawsuit against the City in late 1988.87 At my suggestion,
Kent Teel and several cable subscribers were joined with the Mis-
souri Knights as co-plaintiffs to emphasize that elimination of Kan-
sas City's public access channel to suppress the Knights' viewpoint
had resulted in suppression of other controversial political view-
86. Cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (re-privatization of public park to
ensure exclusion of African-Americans violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
87. At the suggestion of Joe Van Eaton, formerly one of Jim Horwood's colleagues
at Spiegel and McDiarmid, ACV was not named as a defendant in the lawsuit. This was
an important strategic decision. Because ACV declined to intervene as a party defendant,
plaintiffs did not have to address the cable operator's likely defense that public access
channel requirements violate cable operators' First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Time
Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 810 F. Supp. 1302 (D.D.C. 1992).
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points and also adversely affected Kansas City cable subscribers'
ability to receive such viewpoints over local cable channels.88
Several of plaintiffs' claims for relief relied, in part, on public
forum analysis.89 The legislative history of the 1984 Cable Act
describes public access channels as "the video equivalent of the
speaker's soap box or the electronic parallel to the printed leaf-
let."9 Nevertheless, the status of public access channels as public
fora under First Amendment principles had never before been
squarely addressed, let alone resolved, by the courts. Accordingly,
the public forum issues presented in Missouri Knights were ones
of first impression.
The public forum doctrine was born in 1939, when the Supreme
Court decided that certain public places-parks, sidewalks and
streets-had to be available for expressive activities, subject to
reasonable time, place and manner regulations, because they had
"immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, com-
municating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions." 9'
By the 1980s, the Supreme Court had refined public forum
analysis to recognize three categories of government fora.92 First,
there are "traditional" public fora consisting of places that had "by
long tradition or by government fiat ... been devoted to assembly
and debate," such as streets and parks.93 "In these quintessential
88. In other words, at issue was not only the First Amendment right to speak over
public access channels but also the First Amendment right to receive information over
such channels. "The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that the 'interests of
viewers should be considered paramount in the First Amendment calculus."' New York
Citizens Comm. on Cable TV v. Manhattan Cable TV, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 802, 819
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
89. Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, Mo., 723 F. Supp. 1347,
1350 (W.D. Mo. 1989).
90. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4667.
91. Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J.,
concurring).
92. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
93. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. One unanswered question is whether the category of
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public for[a], the government [may] enforce a content-based exclu-
sion [only if] its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end., 94 Second,
there are designated public fora "consist[ing] of public property
which the [government] has opened for use by the public for ex-
pressive activity." 95 Although the government "is not required to
indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it
does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional
public forum. "96 Finally, there are non-public fora consisting of
"public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum
for public communication. 97
traditional public fora is a closed category limited only to public parks, sidewalks and
streets. There is language in some Supreme Court decisions suggesting that other public
places may fall into that category even if they have not been open for expressive activity
from "time out of mind." See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (traditional public fora include
places open for expressive activity "by long tradition or by government fiat"); Members
of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 815 n.32 (1984) (traditional
public fora include government property "clearly held in trust, either by tradition or recent
convention, for the use of citizens at large"). To be sure, the Court recently declined to
classify airport terminals as traditional public fora. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992). But while the Court noted that airport
terminals had not "'immemorially ... time out of mind' been held in the public trust and
used for purposes of expressive activity," id. at 2706 (quoting Hague, 307 U.S. at 515
(Roberts, J., concurring)), that did not end the analysis. The Court also considered wheth-
er "even within the rather short history of air transport," airport terminals had been a
forum for expressive activity. Id. The Court declined to classify the terminals as tradi-
tional public fora only after noting that expressive activity in these public places did not
become "common practice" until recent years. Id.
94. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. In traditional public fora, the government "may also
enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are content-neu-
tral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open
alternative channels of communication." Id.
95. Id.; see, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university meeting
facilities that had been made available for student groups to meet); Southeastern Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal theaters that had been made
available for touring theatrical productions); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (a designated
"public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups ... or
for the discussion of certain subjects").
96. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
97. Id. The government "may reserve [a non-public] forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view."
Id.
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The Supreme Court has also made clear that public forum anal-
ysis applies not only to real property, like parks and streets, but
also to "a particular means of communication" even if it "lacks a
physical status."98 Hence, the mere fact that public access channels
lack a physical status does not render public forum analysis inap-
propriate.
Nevertheless, in Kansas City's motion to dismiss the complaint
for failure to state a claim for relief, its lawyers argued that public
forum analysis was inappropriate because public access channels,
like other cable channels, remained the private property of ACV.
At my suggestion, we argued that the title to Kansas City's public
access channel was irrelevant because the Supreme Court had made
clear in a number of its public forum decisions that even private
property may under some circumstances qualify for public forum
status.99 The district court agreed with our argument in its June
1989 decision denying the City's motion to dismiss.1°°
98. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 805
(1985) (charity drive aimed at federal employee); Perry, 460 U.S. at 47 (school's internal
mail system).
99. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (public forum analysis applied to "public property
or to private property dedicated to public use"); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814 n.32 (1984) (property "owned or controlled by the govern-
ment" may qualify for public forum status); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981) (privately owned mailboxes were part
of a nonpublic forum, i.e., the Postal Service's system for delivery and receipt of mail,
although not ruling that public forum analysis was altogether irrelevant to privately-owned
mailboxes); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (upholding right
to petition in common areas of a large privately-owned shopping center, the Court as-
sumed that those areas had been transformed into a public forum, even though they
remained private property, and owner may adopt time, place and manner regulations);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547, 555 (1975) (holding that
privately-owned theater leased by the local government was designated public forum for
touring theatrical productions); see also Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 103 (Powell, J., concur-
ring) ("I do not interpret our decision today as a blanket approval for state efforts to
transform privately owned commercial property into public forums."); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that the streets and sidewalks in a company-owned town
constituted a public forum); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (although there
was no First Amendment issue, the Court analogized the privately-owned park to the
company-owned town in Marsh v. Alabama).
100. "Whether a particular piece of property is to be considered public for the public
forum analysis has never rested entirely on the status of its owner. Rather, the inquiry
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The district court held, in particular, that plaintiffs' averments,
if proven true, would mean that Channel 20, when it functioned
Kansas City's public access channel, had become a public forum."'1
Without deciding whether Channel 20 had become a traditional or
designated public forum, 0 2 the court ruled that plaintiffs had ade-
quately stated that the public forum had been closed in a manner
inconsistent with First Amendment principles. First, notwithstand-
ing the facial content-neutrality of the Kansas City City Council's
June 1988 resolution, plaintiffs had alleged that the resolution con-
stituted impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination because it
had been adopted to facilitate suppression of the Missouri Knights'
viewpoint from local cable channels. 0 3  Second, even assuming,
arguendo, that the City Council resolution was content-neu-
tral-which it was not-the incidental burden on free speech may
have been greater than necessary to achieve the City's stated inter-
ests. 104
is whether the property is owned or controlled by the government." Missouri Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, Mo., 723 F. Supp. 1347, 1351 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (citing
Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 131 n.7).
101. Plaintiffs had alleged that Channel 20 had been created as a vehicle for public
expression; that ACV could neither exercise editorial control over Channel 20 nor elimi-
nate the channel; and that access was guaranteed on a first-come, first-served basis,
regardless of the programmer's viewpoint. Id. The district court stated that if these
averments proved true, Channel 20 was a public forum. Id. at 1351-52.
102. There is a very credible argument that public access channels are traditional
public fora as well as designated public fora. In many communities, public access has
become a well established local tradition-one recognized, not created, by Congress when
it authorized franchising authorities to require that cable operators set aside certain chan-
nels for public, educational and government access. See 47 U.S.C. § 531 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992). Language in several Supreme Court decisions leaves open the real possibility
that recently created public fora may qualify for "traditional" public forum status. See
supra note 93. The classification of public access channels as traditional, rather than
designated, public fora has important consequences. First, while the closing of a tradi-
tional public forum "is at least presumptively impermissible," United States v. Grace, 461
U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court building), government
"is not required to indefinitely retain the open character" of a designated public forum.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Second, while government may not limit the subject matter of
expression in a traditional public forum, it may create a designated public forum "for a
limited purpose such as... the discussion of certain subjects." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 n.7.
103. Missouri Knights, 723 F. Supp. at 1353.
104. Id.
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The district court also declined to dismiss plaintiffs' other
claims for relief.0 5 Shortly after the district court denied Kansas
City's motion to dismiss, the City agreed to settle the case by re-
scinding the June 1988 resolution and requiring ACV to restore the
public access channel. I donated my $19,000 in attorneys fees to
the ACLU of Kansas and Western Missouri with instructions that
some of the money be used to fund public access programming that
would counter the Missouri Knights' racist viewpoints.
The recognition that public access channels are public fora has
implications extending well beyond the Kansas City case. It was
an issue in the Alliance for Community Media case discussed by
my co-panelists. While the public access petitioners argued that
public and leased access channels were electronic public fora, the
FCC attorneys argued, as Kansas City had done in the Missouri
Knights case, that cable channels are private property to which
public forum analysis does not apply. °6 They also argued that
access channels were merely a new form of common carrier regula-
tion. The federal courts in recent years have upheld severe restric-
tions on adult message services over telephone lines, which the
FCC attorneys argued were equally justified for the cable medi-
um. 10 7 The panel, however, did not address this issue in the No-
vember 1993 opinion.
I never expected that a similar free speech controversy over
public access channels would arise here in New York City. But
recent events have proven me wrong. In January 1993, Manhattan
Neighborhood Network ("MNN"), the community access organiza-
tion ("CAO") that supervised public access channels in Manhattan,
began airing a weekly call-in show called "America Speaks: Race
and Reason," featuring a retired Brooklyn chiropractor who es-
poused a "racialist" viewpoint on a set with the Nazi and Confeder-
ate flags. Produced in Florida, "America Speaks" aired on Manhat-
tan public access channels on a taped basis, at the request of a
105. Id.
106. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 817-18 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
107. Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.




local sponsor. The show's debut went virtually unnoticed. Indeed,
"America Speaks" prompted very few complaints during its first
four months on Manhattan public access channels. In May 1993,
however, a local television news program and several local newspa-
pers did stories on "America Speaks." Almost immediately, MNN
was flooded with phone calls protesting its decision to air "Ameri-
ca Speaks" and threatening MNN with harm if the show was not
cancelled. To its credit, MNN resisted such pressure, noting its
obligation to carry all public access programming on a first-come,
first-served basis. But in late May 1993, the local sponsor decided
to withdraw the show from the Manhattan public access chan-
nels. 08
That, however, was not the end of the matter. Those who had
protested "America Speaks" were not satisfied with the cancellation
of the program. They also sought public disclosure of the identity
of the show's local sponsor. A New York City Councilman named
Ken Fisher invoked a little known rule of the New York State
Commission on Cable Television ("CCT") requiring CAOs such as
MNN to make the names and addresses of all public access pro-
ducers and local sponsors available for public inspection."0 After
MNN reluctantly disclosed thate information, Councilman Fisher
held a press conference to publicly announce the name and address
of the individual who had locally sponsored "America Speaks." At
that press conference, Fisher stated: "Every citizen has an undeni-
able First Amendment right to air his or her views, however dis-
gusting they may be [but] we have the right to share the identity
of someone who would spread such hate in our city." 110
108. See Forum for Bigotry? Fringe Groups on TV, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1993, §
1, at 29; Sponsor Pulls Plug on Nazi's Cable Show, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 22, 1993, at
2; Cable Hate Show Spiked, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 22, 1993, at 29; 'Hate' Show Draws
Fire, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 21, 1993, at 4; see also All You Need is Hate, TIME, June
21, 1993, at 63.
109. Section 595.4(10) of the CCT's rules provides, in pertinent part, that "[lt]he
entity responsible for the administration of a public access channel shall maintain a record
of the use of such channel which shall include the names and addresses of all persons
using or requesting the use of any such channel and which record shall be available for
public inspection for a minimum of two years." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
§ 595.4(10) (1988).
110. Is There a Neo-Nazi Bunkering Down on Montgomery Place?, PARK SLOPE
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In August 1993, a rally organized by the Jewish Defense Orga-
nization ("JDO") and several other local organizations and attended
by several hundred people was held outside that individual's
Brooklyn home. A JDO spokesman stated that the organizers'
objective was not only to protest the local sponsorship of "America
Speaks," but to also force eviction of the local sponsor from his
home and ultimately to drive him from the community." ' I wrote
a letter to one of the local weekly papers objecting to public disclo-
sure of the identity of "America Speaks"' local sponsor because of
its inevitable chilling effect on controversial speech over local
public access channels." 2 I contended that other citizens will think
twice before producing or sponsoring controversial public access
programs that might result in protest rallies outside their homes.
I also questioned the legality of the CCT's rule, noting that in 1960
the Supreme Court in Talley v. California113 had declared invalid
a local law that required disclosure of the sponsor's identity on all
handbills distributed because "identification and fear of reprisals
might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of
importance.""l4 Finally, I predicted that someone would soon bring
a legal challenge to the CCT's public disclosure requirement.
In October 1993, one of 'my former students, Brian D.
Graifman, contacted me regarding two public access producers
whom he had been representing in negotiations with Queens Public
Communications Corporation (d/b/a "QPTV"), the CAO designated
to administer the public access channels in Queens. Chaim Ben
Pesach and Sarah Bat Tzvi had been close friends and followers of
COURIER (Windsor Terrace/Prospect Heights), Aug. 9. 1993, at 1.
111. 300 Demand Nazi Ally Quit Slope Home, PARK SLOPE COURIER (Windsor Ter-
race/Prospect Heights), Aug. 23, 1993, at 13.
112. 1st Amendment Rights, PARK SLOPE COURIER (Park Slope/Windsor Terrace),
Aug. 23, 1993, at 18.
113. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
114. Id. at 64-65. In declaring the handbill disclosure requirement to violate First
Amendment principles, the Court also observed that "[alnonymous pamphlets, leaflets,
brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.
Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to
criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." Id. at 64.
Similarly, Professor Tribe has written that "anonymity has long been recognized as abso-
lutely essential for the survival of dissident movements." LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1019 (2d ed. 1988).
[Vol. 4:801
SYMPOSIUM-PANEL ON CENSORSHIP -
the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, the founder of the Jewish Defense
League who was assassinated in November 1990. Pesach and Tzvi
produced and hosted two public access series, "Positively Jewish"
and "Jewish Task Force on Media Bias," which have aired continu-
ously on public access channels in Manhattan since their debut in
January 1992. The producers seek to expose all enemies of the
Jewish people, and their target audience includes Jews living in
New York City. On their public access shows, Pesach and Tzvi
have long called for the federal arrest and prosecution of El Sayyid
Nosair, who was acquitted of state charges that he had murdered
Meir Kahane and other alleged Islamic-Arab terrorists, including
Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman. Long before the World Trade Center
bombing in February 1993, Pesach and Tzvi predicted Islamic-Arab
terrorist attacks on a grand scale in the United States. During their
public access shows, they regularly invite viewers to write to them
at a post office box address. Needless to say, not everyone agrees
with Pesach and Tzvi's viewpoints. They have received many
death threats.
Shortly after "Positively Jewish" and "Jewish Task Force on
Media Bias" first aired on public access channels in Manhattan in
January 1992, Pesach and Tzvi applied for weekly time slots on
Queens public access channels to air tapes of their public access
shows. QPTV staff, however, told Pesach and Tzvi that they could
not obtain channel time until they had completed QPTV's "train-
ing" course for new public access producers--even though tape
replay of the Manhattan public access shows on Queens public
access channels would not entail use of QPTV's production equip-
ment. This was a mere pretext; in fact, QPTV's rules did not make
completion of the CAO's training course a prerequisite for airing
shows on Queens public access channels.11 5
In June 1993, Pesach and Tzvi renewed their request for chan-
nel time on Queens public access channels, with Graifman's assis-
tance. This time they were told that there were no available time
115. QPTV staff thus did exactly what ACV officials had done to keep the Missouri
Knights off the public access channel in New York City: they made up non-existent
rules. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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slots because Queens public access channels were only on the air
for nine hours a day and 75 percent of that channel was reserved
for "certified" public access producers who had completed QPTV's
training course. The latter reason was another pretext to keep
Pesach and Tzvi's shows off Queens public access channels.
Graifman, however, reviewed QPTV's rules and concluded that
they reserved 75 percent of the channel time for Queens residents
and organizations, not for "certified" producers. Since Pesach resid-
ed in Queens, his shows were eligible for the reserved channel
time. When Graifman disputed QPTV staff's interpretation of their
own rules, they backed down and agreed to air Pesach and Tzvi's
shows, beginning in October 1993.
Pesach and Tzvi completed and submitted QPTV's application,
listing their post office address but not their home addresses. But
shortly after the first show aired in early October, QPTV staff de-
manded that Pesach and Tzvi disclose their residential addresses as
well, which would not only become part of QPTV's internal re-
cords but also be available for public inspection by any person.
Realizing that such public disclosure would place their families'
lives in danger, Pesach and Tzvi balked at this new demand.
QPTV promptly cancelled their shows.
At this point, I became involved in the dispute, assisting
Graifman in preparing legal papers to commence a lawsuit for
declaratory and injunctive relief restoring Pesach and Tzvi's pro-
gramming to Queens public access channels. The day before we
planned to file the lawsuit in the federal court in the Eastern Dis-
trict, Graifman called QPTV's attorneys to advise them that we
would be filing the lawsuit the next day. They asked Graifman to
hold off a day so that QPTV could reconsider its demand for dis-
closure of Pesach and Tzvi's residential addresses. Within a few
days, QPTV had rescinded its demand and agreed to resume airing
Pesach and Tzvi's public access series.
Nevertheless, the CCT's rule requiring CAO's to make the
names and addresses of all public access producers and local spon-
sors available for public inspection remains in effect. While the
CCT's rule evidently requires only the disclosure of a post office
address, I am sure that it will continue to chill the presentation of
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controversial public access programming not only in New York
City but throughout New York State. I hope that someone will
bring a legal challenge to this rule in the near future. This con-
cludes my remarks.
PROFESSOR FLEMING: Let's have some counter-speech by
the government, through Michael Sitcov.
MR. SITCOV: Some government-speech. I don't know that
it's counter-speech, but it seems to me that the discussion you just
heard from Mr. Perry and then from Ms. Heins, gives you some
taste for what people who have to administer programs involving
cable television face. People at opposite ends of the spectrum hate
each other, want to do each other in, and are vying, for example,
for space on cable, and are accusing each other of fomenting vio-
lence, of being irresponsible, of causing great damage.
The Congress, I think quite wisely, has placed very, very nar-
row limitations on certain types of speech with respect to leased
access and PEG programming, and just this little discussion should
give you some sense that it's not a completely crackpot idea to do
SO.
MR. HORWOOD: Let me respond to that. We've got part of
the government that hasn't been paying attention to Congress or the
FCC on censorship issues, and that's the National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration, known as NTIA, which is a
branch of the Department of Commerce. NTIA was required by
the prior Congress to do a report on the role of telecommunications
in hate crimes, and they issued a notice of proposed rulemaking, 1 6
and it turns out that the comments indicated that there really wasn't
any problem because telecommunications did not cause hate
crimes.
MR. SITCOV: I'm not suggesting that it does.
MR. HORWOOD: And what you do have is when you're
willing to look at things objectively and actually go out and get the
data, you come up with this kind of finding, and I'm quoting from
NTIA, after looking at the evidence of lack of evidence that was
116. 58 Fed. Reg. 16,340 (1993).
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presented to it: "The best response to hate speech is more speech
to educate the public and promote greater tolerance, rather than
government censorship or regulation. This is consistent with the
well-recognized theory that free speech serves an 'enlightenment
function."' 1 7 And it says: "Government can take further steps to
ensure that hate speech is met with more speech. Examples in-
clude: (1) Intensifying efforts by government officials to speak out
against bigotry and prejudice in American society; (2) Encouraging
the private media industries to produce and disseminate program-
ming to counter messages of hatred and prejudice, and to educate
their audiences about the destructive impact of intolerance."' 1 8
And so, what you have here is kind of a traditional First
Amendment approach that I don't think we should be losing sight
of. The real pernicious effect of what happened in Kansas City
until access got restored is you had the Ku Klux Klan in effect
destroying a forum for other people to talk. And I guess I take the
view-and I don't think it's Pollyanna-ish-that if you've got this
hate and bigotry out there, the worst thing you can do is to keep it
hidden and simmering. Bring it out into the open and debate it and
talk about it-that's been the model, as Bob talked about, that
public access tended to follow with "Race and Reason" everywhere
else, except in Kansas City, where counterprogramming was fos-
tered. What happened is, while it was obviously discomforting to
have this kind of programming, especially for those who were tar-
geted by it, most people realize it turned out to be a good thing,
because this programming, which was poorly produced, went away
and the human rights programming that was counterprogramming
tended to last.
I'm personally a little bit uncomfortable because this all hap-
pened prior to getting somebody like David Duke-who is a lot
slicker than Tom Metzger in getting across his message-and I
don't know whether in the future I'd be here saying, well gee, let's
get it all out because good speech is going to drive out the bad
117. National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Report to Con-
gress, The Role of Telecommunications in Hate Crimes (1993).
118. Id. (numerals added).
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speech. It's easy when the bad speech is clumsily presented and
delivered, but when you get people slick doing it, I don't know.
But at least for the moment, I feel a lot more comfortable in letting
it all hang out and trying to get the good speech out there and
getting the hate speech exposed and countered.
PROFESSOR FLEMING: Marjorie, did you want to say any-
thing?
MS. HEINS: Well I'll just make a brief philosophical com-
ment, but then I see some hands up, so maybe we should let these
patient folks talk.
What I have seen in the last couple of years is growing intoler-
ance for the fundamental notion of free speech. Jim addressed that
a little bit, and in its place, there is this notion that we can't afford
to have the First Amendment-it's too dangerous because, after all,
everybody knows that violent television programming causes kids
to behave like Beavis and Butthead and causes adolescents to lie
down on the highway, and pornography causes men to become
rapists. This scapegoating of speech--or blaming the book, as one
of my colleagues calls it-has become a very common, pervasive
attitude among the American public, and what's dangerous about
that is not only that it's untrue empirically that arts and entertain-
ment cause people to become violent or criminal in the sort of
simplistic cause-and-effect way that smoking causes cancer. It's
different and more complicated when you're dealing with the hu-
man brain and the multifarious ways in which human personalities,
with all the different variables that go into our personalities, re-
spond to an image.
What it's really about is not empirical causation, but attitudes
and the formation of attitudes which are much more complicated,
and what you would end up doing if you followed that kind of
scapegoating speech causation theory-that is, we want to keep
hate speech off, we want to keep violence off-is you would com-
pletely eviscerate the First Amendment without probably making
any perceptible impact on the problems of social dysfunction, fami-
ly dysfunction, sexual violence, and other violence.
The other thing that this blaming of the media does, of course,
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is it's very convenient for politicians, be it Jesse Helms or Paul
Simon-Jesse Helms fulminating against pornography, Paul Simon
fulminating against violence. It's very convenient for them because
it distracts people; it grabs us. These are hot-button issues. We
think our politicians are doing something about crime and violence
and misogyny and they're not; they're ignoring those issues, and
we have to address the real world issues, which, of course, the
media only reflect.
MR. SITCOV: I just want to say one thing about that, and I'll
limit it simply to obscenity and indecency. I don't think the courts
have ever required the Congress or the states to demonstrate by
empirical data that there is a direct relationship between pornog-
raphy and indecency and sexual crime, for example. I think what
Miller and the cases before it recognize is that there are certain
fundamental characteristics about that type of communication that
are inimical to society, irrespective of whether the direct result of
those things is wife beating or some other truly horrible situation,
and I think that on that level alone, it simply can't be dismissed as
ridiculous or irresponsible for Congress to take some action about
that type of fare on cable television.
PROFESSOR FLEMING: Let's take some questions from the
audience.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Did someone from Manhattan Neigh-
borhood Network or QPTV, the Queens Public Television, address
Mr. Perry's points? I just want to raise the issue of the addresses.
Essentially, access organizations are supposed to be primarily local
access organizations, they're supposed to allow local people from
the borough, community franchise area, to gain access. That's the
reason for the addresses, so they can be sure it's someone either
sponsoring or from the community. It's not supposed to be avail-
able to anyone from Oshkosh or Portland, and that essentially is the
reason for the address requirement. The other thing is it's public
access and you're supposed to encourage a debate, shouldn't there
be some willingness to sign your work?
MR. PERRY: There are two separate issues here. First of all,
the CAO may have legitimate interest in collecting personal infor-
mation from access producers to be used internally by the CAO.
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That's one issue. At first blush it seems perfectly legitimate for
the CAO to require public access producers to disclose their names
and addresses so the CAO can verify that you are a local resident,
or that you are who you say you are. But the problem here is that
a state rule requires such personal information collected by the
CAO for legitimate internal purposes be made available for re-
disclosure to the public. Producers names and addresses thus be-
come part of the public record. And I can tell you how that came
about, because ironically, I had something to do with the promulga-
tion of that language, in a rulemaking proceeding that ended in the
late 1980s. I, at that time, had been representing various public
access producers, who were concerned about their inability to net-
work among themselves. They all had complaints about the admin-
istration of public access channels here in Manhattan, yet they
didn't know each other's names and addresses, they needed to have
some way of communicating with each other, and so we proposed
that the names and addresses of public access producers be publicly
available except in the event that a producer opts for privacy. The
language was adopted without the exception clause. Again, there
are two steps here. The first step is the disclosure of the informa-
tion to the CAO, and the second step is the redisclosure to the
public. I'm particularly concerned about the second step. I'm not
as much concerned about the first step, but in the QPTV situation,
because of time constraints, I didn't have a chance to go through
all of the examples of bad faith on the part of QPTV staff, which
had, over a number of months-and I abbreviated the story-given
various pretexts for keeping Pesach and Tzvi's programs off the
air. Given the bad faith record, my clients were greatly concerned
that QPTV would not insure confidentiality of their residential
addresses. But maybe if there were sufficient information manage-
ment protections, that would be okay.
Why should anybody be concerned about their identification
with a certain program? Again, the problem is that with dissident
programming, with marginal programming, people want that pro-
gramming out there, but they don't want to take all the flak. They
don't want to have protests outside their home, or outside their
place of work, or outside their church, or whatever. The public
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disclosure requirement thus doesn't further debate; it chills debate.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think if you can't address the coun-
ter-point, the counter-argument to a sponsor, to an author, then you
really are curtailing debate.
MR. PERRY: You could air the same counterprogramming and
reach the very same audience over public access channels, and I'm
sure the local sponsor would see that programming, so I don't see
debate being curtailed at all.
PROFESSOR FLEMING: Thank you very much.
